The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetricvalued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level firstprice sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.
Bidding, Pricing, and User Subscription Dynamics in Asymmetric-Valued Korean LTE Spectrum Auction: A Hierarchical Dynamic Game Approach
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
W ITH the popularity of smartphones, tablets, and ever more data hungry applications, the demand for mobile data traffic continues to grow dramatically. According to a Cisco report, global mobile data traffic will increase 10-fold between 2014 and 2019 [1] . As a remedy, the numerous technology enhancements of long term evolution (LTE) (i.e., LTE-Advanced) have been proposed, yet this technology evolution alone is not sufficient [2] , [3] . The need for additional spectrum is critical to address the explosive data challenges successfully. However, wireless spectrum is a scarce resource, and thus has been tightly regulated by allocating spectrum blocks to licensed cellular operators [4] . Moreover, given spectrum allocations today, it is less likely to exploit a contiguous bandwidth wider than 20 MHz or even a 20 MHz contiguous bandwidth [5] . These spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation pose increasing challenges of additional spectrum allocation, from a regulator's perspective. Our study is motivated by the latest LTE spectrum auction in South Korea on the basis of the above considerations [6] . The key issue was whether or not Korea Telecom (KT) secures 10 MHz of contiguous spectrum in the 1.8 GHz band. Because of KT's current 10 MHz downlink carrier in this band, KT could directly launch the wideband LTE services (i.e., up to 150 Mbps in the downlink) at little expense, offering faster connections compared with the normal LTE (i.e., up to 75 Mbps in the downlink). This is because LTE Release 8/9 can support a maximum of 20 MHz of contiguous spectrum. On the other hand, the other operators requested the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) to exclude KT from bidding on the contiguous spectrum block to ensure fair competition. In order to provide the double-speed LTE services like KT, they should deploy the inter-band non-contiguous carrier aggregation (CA) (i.e., LTEAdvanced services), which requires huge investments as well as some deployment time. In light of these conflicting views, the allocation of new spectrum resources is not purely a technical issue, but economic and regulatory considerations should be taken into account as well.
Multi-level hierarchical structures have been widely applied in wireless markets. The paper [7] studied the price-based resource allocation problem of two operators in a two-level hierarchical static game. By taking into account dynamic pricing and user subscription dynamics, a multi-level hierarchical dynamic game was proposed in [8] - [12] . Particularly, in [12] , a modular multi-layer modeling framework and simulation platform were developed to analyze a wireless access market under different service types. However, these prior works did not consider the acquisition of spectrum to be allocated in a higher level.
Auctions have been widely used to allocate wireless spectrum. For multi-level hierarchical structures considering spectrum allocation issue, most of prior works have assumed that bidders (i.e., operators) are self-interested, i.e., they only maximize their own profits regardless of the profits of other bidders [13] - [17] . However, considerable mismatches between the theory of self-interest and the outcome of the real-world auction have been observed [18] . This can be explained by a spite motive, which is the preference to deteriorate the profits of their competitors [19] . In a highly competitive wireless industry, for instance, the loss for one side may entail the corresponding gain for the other side. Therefore, operators will intend to maximize their own profit, as well as minimize the profits of their com- petitors in the auction for improving their own standing, which inspires our work to model and analyze the bidding behavior of such spiteful operators.
B. Contributions of This Paper
This paper studies spiteful bidding and dynamic pricing competition between the two operators (i.e., duopoly), taking into account user subscription dynamics.
Given that asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them, we formulate the interactions between the two operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework. In the upper level, the two operators spitefully compete in a first-price sealed-bid auction with considering their current spectrum holdings. Different from the standard auction game in the existing literature, each operator maximizes the weighted difference of his own profit to that of his competitor. In the lower level, the two operators optimally set their dynamic pricing strategies to maximize their long-term revenues, considering user subscription dynamics with the newly allocated spectrum. Unlike the traditional static game model [20] , we formulate a (noncooperative) differential game and derive a closedloop Nash equilibrium to capture the price dynamics and the corresponding user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions.
The contributions of this paper are summarized follows: • We propose a hierarchical dynamic game framework to jointly study spiteful bidding, dynamic pricing, and user subscription dynamics, taking into account operators' existing spectrum holdings.
• We highlight the impact of different timing to launch the double-speed LTE services between the two operators on price dynamics and user subscription dynamics. We further investigate the effects of users' net switching costs, playing a role in a subsidy for the market share leader, and a tax for the market share followers. Based on this, we examine the asymmetric values of contiguous spectrum and non-contiguous spectrum blocks.
• We study the bidding behavior of spiteful operators and the resultant profits of them. We verify our studies by comparing the latest results of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea. This provides the design guidelines of asymmetricvalued LTE spectrum auction. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model and the proposed hierarchical dynamic game framework. Sections III and IV investigate the closed-loop Nash equilibriums taking into account user subscription dynamics in asymmetric and symmetric phases, respectively. Section V analyzes the spiteful bidding strategies and the resultant profits. Section VI provides numerical results to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation, followed by concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider two operators, say 1 and 2, bidding for two spectrum blocks A and B in a first-price sealed-bid auction, as shown in Fig. 1 . In this auction, the two operators simultaneously submit their bids in closed envelopes and the operator with the highest bid wins, and pays its bid for the spectrum block. Note that A and B are the same amount of downlink 10 MHz bandwidth. Without loss of generality, we consider only the downlink throughout the paper. Note that both operators deploy frequency division duplex LTE (FDD LTE) and provide services to users in the same geography area.
Due to the operators' existing spectrum holdings, the timing to launch the double-speed LTE services depends on the results of the LTE spectrum auction. If A is assigned to operator 1, the double-speed LTE services 1 are directly provided to users. On the other hand, the other operator 2 who acquires B should deploy the inter-band non-contiguous CA to exploit fragmented spectrum, enabling to offer double-speed LTE service to users. However, it requires some deployment time T 2 . Note that in general it takes at least several months. In South Korea, for instance, SK Telecom (SKT) and LG U+ took 6 months to launch LTE-A career aggregation in major cities, and 9 months for nation-wide coverage [6] . For notational convenience, we assume that operator 1 acquires A, which will be relaxed in Section V.
Since the deployment time T completely alters the nature of the operators' dynamic pricing strategies and the user subscription dynamics, we analyze two phases t < T and t ≥ T , separately, by defining the following terms. 
B. A Hierarchical Dynamic Game Framework
We formulate the interactions between the two operators and the users as a hierarchical dynamic game as shown in Fig. 2 . The proposed game consists of two levels: An upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game for bidding competition between two spiteful operators, and a lower-level differential game for dynamic pricing competition between them considering user subscription dynamics.
1) Lower-level differential game: Users dynamically decide whether to stay in their current operator or to switch to the other operator for utility maximization. This user subscription dynamics depends on the perceived utilities, the operators' current prices, switching costs, and price subsidies. Given the current operators' market shares, the operators optimally set their service prices (i.e., time-dependent) to maximize their long-term revenues with the newly allocated spectrum. We model a differential game to completely characterize the operators' dynamic pricing strategies and the corresponding user subscription dynamics in two phases.
2) Upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game: Two spiteful operators compete in a first-price sealed-bid auction based on the estimated long-term revenues in the lower level. Since the realized profits are tightly coupled across the operators, the objective of each operator is maximizing the weighted difference of his own profit to that of his rival, where the weight γ is the spite (or competition) coefficient that denotes the degree of competition.
III. USER SUBSCRIPTION DYNAMICS AND DYNAMIC PRICING COMPETITION IN ASYMMETRIC PHASE
We consider a continuum of users that subscribes to one of the operators based on his or her operator preference. This continuum model, a widely used model to analyze the wireless communication industry, reflects the reality well if there are a sufficiently large number of users so that a single user is negligible [8] , [23] , [24] . We assume that the total population is normalized to 1. Let x i (t) denote the market share of operator i ∈ {1, 2}, where
is the initial market share of operator i. In South Korea, all the operators offer nation-wide LTE coverage geographically, and mobile phone penetration exceeds 100%, meaning that there are more phones than people in use [25] . In this regard, we assume that all users necessarily subscribe to one of the operators, i.e., x 1 (t) + x 2 (t) = 1. We also assume that operators 1 and 2 provide same quality in communication services to the users so that they have the same reserve utility u 0 before spectrum allocation 3 .
A. Lower-Level Differential Game in Asymmetric Phase
1) User subscription dynamics model:
In asymmetric phase, the users in operators 1 and 2 obtain different utilities, i.e.,
where η ∈ (0, 1) is a user sensitivity parameter to the doublespeed LTE service than existing one. Note that in general, licensed spectrum access can ensure quality of service (QoS)-guaranteed services to the users. To highlight the data rate difference between the double-speed and the normal LTE services, for simplicity, we assume that all the users obtain same utility (1 + η)u 0 from the double-speed LTE service, where the value of η is exogenously defined. In the future work, we plan to study the case where the users have heterogeneous demands for higher data rates. As η increases, the users care more about the data rate. The users in operator 2 thus have more incentive to switch to operator 1 as η increases. When they decide to change operator 1, however, they face two different types of economic factors: switching cost and price subsidy. The former that a user has to pay when changing operators is the disutility that a user experiences, while the latter that the operators give a subsidy to attract their competitors' users is the utility that a user receives. Different users confront with different levels of switching costs and price subsidies. To model such users' heterogeneity, we assume that the price subsidy p s and the switching cost c s are variables over [0, s] and [0, s], respectively. For simplicity, we further assume that the net switching cost s = c s − p s , the difference between the switching cost and the price subsidy, is uniformly distributed in [−s, s] with 0 < s ≤ s. When s → −s 4 , the user has more incentive to switch to the other operator while the converse is when s → s. Now let us focus on how user subscription dynamics works in asymmetric phase. A user k in operator i ∈ {1, 2}, with net switching cost, s k , observes the prices charged by operators 1 and 2 (p 1 (t) and p 2 (t)). A user k in operator i will switch to operator j = i if
Thus the mass of switching users from operator i to j is
Note that the mass of staying users in operator i is q ii (t) = 1 − q ij (t).
In the following analysis, we restrict our attention to the case where the switching from one operator to another in both directions is always possible (i.e., q ij (t) belong to (0, 1)). This means that the two operators are competing fiercely for market share by retaining their own users as well as stealing their rival's users. To this end, we assume p 1 (t)− p 2 (t) ∈ (ηu 0 − s, ηu 0 + s) so that the price difference between the two operators is not to large. Then, (3) can be expressed as
where q ij (t) belong to (0, 1). The net change in operator i's market share in the infinitesimal time interval (t, t + dt], the difference between the mass of switching users from operator j to i and the mass of switching users from operator i to j, can be expressed as follows:
Then each operator's market share rate at time t over [0, T ) iṡ
where s 1 = s + s. Note that the ratesẋ 1 (t) andẋ 2 (t) are functions of the current service prices p 1 (t) and p 2 (t), the current market shares x 1 (t) and x 2 (t), the user sensitivity parameter η, and the minimum (or maximum) of users' net switching costs s (or s).
2) Operators' pricing model:
Given the user subscription dynamics (5), operators 1 and 2 simultaneously determine their prices (p 1 (t), p 2 (t)) so that their total revenues are maximized over [0, T ).
Here, the revenue rate is the sum of revenue from current users and revenue gain/loss from new/old users. For each operator i ∈ {1, 2}, the optimal pricing control problem over a finite-time horizon [0, T ) can be expressed as follows:
where ρ is the discount rate taking into account the time value of money, and x 0 1 is the initial market share of operator 1. Sincė x 2 (t) = −ẋ 1 (t) and x 2 (0) = 1−x 1 (0), we can describe the user subscription dynamics constraints by only (8) and (9) . Note that each operator's pricing strategy depends on not only the competitor's pricing strategy but also, the market share state (i.e., the market shares of the two operators) that evolves according to a user subscription dynamic constraint in (8) . This allows us to formulate and analyze the optimization problem P1 within the differential fame framework [27] .
3) Formulation of differential game:
Now we formulate the dynamic pricing competition between the two operators as a finite-horizon differential game as follows.
• Players: Two operators 1 and 2.
• Strategy space: Operator 1 can choose price p 1 (t) from the continuous and bounded set P 1 = [0, (1+η)u 0 ] while operator 2 can choose price p 2 (t) from P 2 = [0, u 0 ]. This is due to the assumption x 1 (t)+x 2 (t) = 1 so that all users are served.
• Market share state: The market shares of the two operators constitute the market share state denoted by a vector
T , where the state is controlled by the user subscription dynamics constraint in (8) .
• Payoff function: Two operators want to maximize their total discounted revenues over a prespecified time horizon in (7), respectively.
B. Closed-loop Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Phase
For the formulated finite-horizon differential game, we will investigate the two operators' dynamic pricing competition and the corresponding user subscription dynamics. To understand the two operator's dynamic pricing strategies in the differential games literature, we first want to point out two main types of strategies: Open-loop strategies and closed-loop strategies. The open-loop strategies do not involve strategic interaction between the two operators through the evolution of the market share state over time and the corresponding adjustment in their prices. This means that the two operators announce their pricing strategies at the initial time and commit to them, regardless of how the market share state x(t) evolves. In this regard, the open-loop strategies are not time-consistent. On the other hand, the closedloop strategies take into account the initial and current market share state, allowing the two operators to determine and adjust their pricing strategies as x(t) changes. Thus, we consider the closed-loop strategies to capture the price dynamics and the corresponding user subscription dynamics.
With the notion of closed-loop strategies, the closed-loop Nash equilibrium is defined as follows:
is called a closed-loop Nash equilibrium if the following holds:
for all p i ∈ P i , and for any initial market share
At a closed-loop Nash equilibrium, no operator can increase its revenue by changing its strategy unilaterally, given the current pricing strategy of the other operator.
To obtain the closed-loop Nash equilibrium and the resultant user subscription dynamics, we need to first examine the necessary conditions by applying the Pontryagin maximum principle [28] H
where λ i (t) is the co-state variable of operator i associated with the market share x 1 (t). For simplicity, we will drop the time dependence expression t from all variables, unless specified otherwise.
Since the Hamiltonian function for operator i is strictly concave in the price p i , the necessary conditions for the closed-loop Nash equilibrium provide sufficient conditions for optimality, i.e.,ẋ
Note that (12) is the maximum condition with respect to the strategy of operator i, (13) is the adjoint equation to describe the dynamics of the co-state variable, and (14) is the boundary condition for the terminal time of the co-state variable. We further note that the term (∂H i /∂p j )(∂p j /∂x 1 ) in (13) affects how the two operators adjust their prices as x(t) evolves over time. By solving the above conditions, we can obtain the following proposition. Proposition 1. Let
(17) where
, μ(t)= 13s+5s+6k(t) 9s 1 +ρ, 
IV. USER SUBSCRIPTION DYNAMICS AND DYNAMIC PRICING COMPETITION IN SYMMETRIC PHASE
In the previous section, we have studied the dynamic pricing competition of the two operators and the corresponding user subscription dynamics in asymmetric phase. In this section, we consider them in symmetric phase by formulating an infinitehorizon differential game. The analysis is similar to the previous section and thus this section is brief.
A. Lower-Level Differential Game in Symmetric Phase
1) User subscription dynamics model:
Since operator 2 launches double-speed LTE service in symmetric phase, we assume that the users in operators 1 and 2 obtain same utility, i.e.,
Similar to the analysis in subsection III-A, assuming that p 1 (t)−p 2 (t)∈[−a, a] so that q 21 (t) and q 12 (t) belong to (0, 1), each operator's market share rate at time t over [T, ∞) iṡ
2) Operators' pricing model: Given the user subscription dynamics (19) , each operator's revenue rate at time t in symmetric phase can be written as follows:
For each operator i∈{1, 2}, the optimal pricing control problem over an infinite-time horizon [T, ∞) can be expressed as follows.
P2: max
where x T 1 is the initial market share of operator 1 from the end of asymmetric phase.
3) Formulation of differential game: The dynamic pricing competition between the two operators can be formulated as an infinite-horizon differential game as follows.
• Strategy space: Operator i can choose price p i (t) from the continuous and bounded set
• Market share state: The market share state
T is controlled by the user subscription dynamics constraint in (19) .
• Payoff function: The two operators want to maximize their total discounted revenues over a prespecified time horizon in (21), respectively.
B. Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Phase
To proceed with the analytical solution of the formulated infinite-horizon differential game, we now focus on the closedloop Nash equilibrium solutions and the consequent user subscription dynamics of problem P2. Recall that at a closed-loop Nash equilibrium, no operator has an incentive to deviate from its strategy after considering the other operator's strategy. The closed-loop Nash equilibrium and the consequent user subscription dynamics are given in the following proposition. Proposition 2. Let which concludes lim t→∞ x * 1 (t)=1/2. Since lim t→∞ x * 1 (t)=1/2, it is observed that after some algebra both operators' equilibrium prices converge to the same prices, i.e., lim t→∞ p * i (t)=s 1 /2−s 2 /(3(1+ρ)), i=1, 2, which completes the proof. 2 Note that, unlike some previous works [11] , [12] , [29] where there is a price dynamics that the operators increase and decrease their prices periodically, we lacks such price dynamics because our analysis focuses on a pure strategy closed-loop Nash equilibrium and rules out mixed strategies like other studies in network economics [10] , [30] . Nevertheless, we can still infer same intuition that the operators' pricing competition will be fiercer in symmetric phase.
V. BIDDING COMPETITION
In the upper level, the two spiteful operators compete in a first-price sealed-bid auction where asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks A and B are auctioned off to them. For fair competition, each operator is constrained to lease only one spectrum block (i.e., A or B). We assume that the regulators set the reserve prices c A and c B to A and B, respectively. Note that reserve price is the minimum price to get the spectrum block. Since A is the high-valued spectrum block, we further assume that the two spiteful operators are only competing on A to provide double-speed LTE service to their users earlier.
Based on the projected total revenues of the two operators in the lower level, operators 1 and 2 bid A independently as b 1 and b 2 , respectively. For mathematical tractability, we assume that both operators are aware of their competitor's projected total revenues (i.e., complete information). In practice, however, there are several potential sources for uncertainty in them (i.e., price discount coupons, contracts with a certain term). In this case, B is assigned to the operator who loses in the auction as the reserve price c B . Since this operator should make huge investments to double the existing LTE network capacity compared to the other MNO,we approximate the total cost (i.e., CAPEX/OPEX) of only operator who acquires B as a one-time expense c BS . Such approximation is reasonable because an operator's initial investment of infrastructure/network can be more costly than the maintenance cost in the future.
For notational convenience, we have assumed that operator 1 procures A throughout the paper. Without loss of generality, however, we can relax this assumption easily after some algebraic manipulations. The projected aggregate revenues of the two operators over the entire time-horizon [0, ∞] can be expressed as follows:
• Assuming that operators 1 and 2 acquire A and B respectively, each operator's projected aggregate revenue during the entire period is
where R
AP i
and R
SP i
are described in (7) and (21), respectively, for i=1, 2.
• Assuming that operators 1 and 2 procure B and A respectively, each operator's projected aggregate revenue during the entire period is
AP i
SP i
for i=1, 2 can be obtained by reformulating problems P1 and P2, and following the same steps as in Appendices A and B. Details are omitted for brevity. When asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are allocated to the operators, there is a trade-off between self-interest and spite. To illustrate this trade-off, we first restrict ourselves to the case where the spite is not present. If operator i is self-interested, his objective function is as follows:
where I is the indicator function, b i is the bidding strategy for operator i, and π
BS is the profit from B for i = 1, 2. This is the standard auction framework in that operator i maximizes his own profit without considering the profit of his competitor.
In the real world, however, there are observations that some operators are completely malicious. In third generation spectrum auction in Germany, for example, German telecom attempted to raise an enormous amount of money to drive out one of its competitors [18] . If operator i is completely malicious, his objective function can be changed as follows:
It means that operator i only intends to minimize the profit of operator j.
Departing from the standard auction framework, our model tries to incorporate this strategic concern in that each spiteful operator cares about maximizing the weighted difference of his own profit to that of his competitor. To this end, for mathematical tractability, we use one scalar value γ ∈ [0, 1] to model the behavior of operators ranging from self-interested to completely malicious. Combining (29) and (30) 
where I is the indicator function, π Note that (31) will be used to determine the bidding strategies of two spiteful operators, which does not affect the realized profits of the two operators. As described, operator i is selfinterested and only intends to maximize his own profit when γ = 0. When γ = 1, operator i is completely malicious and only tries to minimize the profit of his competitor. It is worth pointing out that our objective function in Definition 4 has been also adopted in recent work to study, for example, spiteful behaviors in second-price sealed-bid auctions [31] , and optimal traffic routing strategy for transportation [32] . For given γ ∈ [0, 1], we can derive the optimal bidding strategies that maximize the objective function in Definition 4 as follows.
Proposition 4. In a first-price sealed-bid auction, the equilibrium bidding strategies for two operators 1 and 2 are given by
Proof. See Appendix C. 2
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, several numerical results are presented to investigate the impact of spectrum allocation on market structure, and provide insights into the role of the regulator. For illustration convenience, we assume that operators 1 and 2 acquire the spectrum blocks A and B, respectively, unless otherwise specified.
A. Dynamics of Pricing Competition and User Subscription
We first study the impact of spectrum allocation on the two operators' dynamic pricing strategies and the resultant user subscription dynamics. As a benchmark, we focus on the symmetric market share before spectrum allocation where the initial market state of the two operators are chosen as x(0) = [0.5, 0.5]. Fig. 3 shows the two operators' equilibrium pricing strategies and the corresponding user subscription dynamics under different deployment times. In asymmetric phase (t < T ), due to the earlier launch of double-speed LTE service, we see that operator 1 becomes the market share leader while charging a higher price. An interesting observation is that p * 1 (t) and x * 1 (t) increase in t, while the reverse is true for operator 2. These phenomena are due to the presence of the users' net switching costs. As t increases, the more users with the high net switching costs are locked in, allowing operator 1 to optimally raise p * 1 (t) by the amount of the net switching costs with the increase in x * 1 (t). This forces operator 2 to reduce p * 2 (t) but with the decrease in x * 2 (t). The users' net switching costs, thus, can be interpreted as a subsidy for operator 1 and a tax for operator 2. It is also worth pointing out that the longer deployment time T is the slower rate of increase of p * 1 (t) for operator 1, while the faster rate of decrease of p * 2 (t) for operator 2 at the lower initial prices p * 1 (0) and p * 2 (0). With the longer T , operator 1 has more to gain by charging p * 1 (t) less aggressively and attaining x * 1 (t) more aggressively for the same t, thereby maximizing the aggregated revenue R AP 1 (T ) over [0, T ). On the other hand, operator 2 tries to maximize R AP 2 (T ) by decreasing p * 2 (t) more aggressively, but losing more x * 2 (t) for the same t. In symmetric phase (t ≥ T ), due to the same services offered by the two operators 1 and 2, each operator faces a trade-off between a low price to increase its market share, and a high price to harvest its revenue by exploiting users' net switching costs. As shown in Fig. 3 , the large operator 1 charges a high price while the small operator 2 charges a low price. Thus, the asymmetries of their market shares and prices fade away over time. We also observe that the slower rate of the steady state as T increases. However, a key limitation of our analysis is that users' net switching costs are assumed to be symmetric between the two operators for mathematical tractability. This actually leads to a symmetric situation where the two operators offer the same service at the same price, and users are split half-half in steady state. On the other hand, the asymmetries of the operators' market shares and prices in symmetric phase still remain in practice. In South Korea, for example, SKT remains the market share leader despite charging a little higher price than the market followers. This could be explained by other asymmetric switching costs among the operators (i.e., different degrees of user loyalty in the operators) as discussed in [10] . Thus, it will be an interesting future research for modeling the asymmetry in users' net switching costs to fit into the reality well.
B. Values of Contiguous and Non-Contiguous Spectrum
In this subsection, we examine the values of two different spectrum blocks: Contiguous spectrum block A and noncontiguous spectrum block B. To this end, we define the revenue gain as follows: Fig. 4 shows how R gain changes in T with different parameters η and x(0). Intuitively, the revenue gain is strictly increasing over T and this gain becomes much higher as η or x 0 1 increase. In order to ensure fair competition among the operators, the regulators (i.e., the KCC) should appropriately impose limits on the timing of the double-speed LTE services. For example, in South Korea, KT could not start its double-speed LTE services in major cites until March 2014, and nation-wide coverage until July [6]. It implies that the KCC gave its competitors (SKT and LG U+) time to prepare and roll out the same services using interband non-contiguous CA. It also explains how critical new spectrum is allocated to both operators, and why they should spitefully bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction to achieve a dominant position or compensate the revenue gap.
C. Bidding Strategies and Resultant Profits
Based on the estimated values of two different spectrum blocks, we investigate the two operators' equilibrium bidding strategies and their corresponding profits. To this end, the initial market share state are set to x(0) = [0.6, 0.4]. Fig. 5 shows how the two operator's equilibrium bidding strategies realize when the spite coefficient γ varies under two different deployment times. Intuitively, the more spiteful the two operators are, the more aggressively they tend to bid. Since more spiteful operator gets more disutility from the profit of his competitor, he is willing to sacrifice some monetary payoff in order to minimize his rival's profit.
Although this paper focused on two operator case (i.e., duopoly), the results of South Korea's LTE spectrum auction showed that there were indeed spiteful behaviors. In South Korea, there are three operators. Specifically, SKT and LG U+ firstly cooperated with each other, and spitefully attempted to discourage KT from procuring 15 MHz (UL: 5 MHz, DL: 10 MHz) of contiguous spectrum in the 1.8 GHz band. During the process of simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction 5 , SKT dropped out from it and pursued its own profit. At this time, the price of 15 MHz of contiguous spectrum in the 1.8 GHz was only $400 billion. However, LG U+ kept raising the price until the 50th round of simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction. Hence, the KCC changed the simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction to the first-price sealed-bid auction. Although 5 In a simultaneous multiple-round auction, a set of spectrum blocks is auctioned simultaneously with specific time length of each round and this auction only ends until there are no new bids on any of spectrum blocks. This form has been widely used for the regulator to pursue maximum social welfare (see [33] for detailed explanations). LG U+ failed to KT from securing 10 MHz of contiguous spectrum in the 1.8 GHz band, its price raised up to $900 billion. Considering the fact that SKT won 15 MHz (UL: 5 MHz, DL: 10 MHz) in the 1.8 GHz band for $450 billion and LG U+ won 40 MHz (UL: 20 MHz, DL: 20 MHz) in the 2.6 GHz band for $478 billion, KT paid more money to secure the contiguous spectrum block [6] . This implies how the spite motive fills the gap between the theory of self-interest and the outcome of the real-world auction. It is worth noting that there is a cross-over point at γ = 0.5. This can be interpreted as the different levels of the utility (or disutility) of winning (or losing) the auction between the two operators. When γ < 0.5, the more emphasis they put on their own profits, inducing operator 1 to place a higher bid because he could make more profit from A. When γ > 0.5, on the other hand, they are more interested in minimizing the profits of their competitors, prompting operator 2 to bid more aggressively since she could reduce operator 1's profit more when acquiring A, and thus increase her relative position in the market. This may explains why KT (i.e., a small operator) placed a bid twice as high as SKT (i.e., a large operator) for procuring the contiguous spectrum block [6] . We also observe that the equilibrium bidding strategies of the two operator increase as T increases. It implies that the longer T promotes the more fierce competition between operators. Fig. 6 shows the resultant profits of the two operators as a function of γ under two different deployment times. When γ < 0.5, the two operators are more interested in maximizing their profits, resulting in the large difference between their profits as T increases or γ decreases. It implies that the small oper-ator 2 should place a more spiteful bid as T increases in order to improve (or maintain) his own standing in a highly competitive market. When γ > 0.5, the difference between their profits decreases as T decreases for the same γ, allowing operator 2 to increase his relative position in the market by bidding more aggressively. However, when γ = 0.6 and T = 1.5, the profit of operator 2 is more than 35% compared with that of operator 1. It offers meaningful insights into the role of the regulators in that the longer T hinders fair competition between the two operators.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a comprehensive analytical and numerical studies of the effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. We model the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price seals-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive and characterize the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest results of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea. This serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. There are several possible directions for future work. First, we can consider the case where users' net switching costs are asymmetric. It will be useful to fit into the reality well. Second, we can consider the multiple operator case (i.e., oligopoly), where each operator has different extents of spite toward its competitors. This analysis is much more complex, but it will be valuable to provide additional new insights into spectrum auction designs.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
From (12), we have the two operators' best response functions,
Using them gives equilibrium prices,
Next, from (13) and (35), we obtain the following partial differential equations,
We solve this system of differential equations by the method of undetermined coefficients. Assume that λ i (t) = k i (t)x 1 (t)+ e i (t) for i = 1, 2. Substitution into (36) yieldṡ
whereẋ 1 is given in (8) . Since the equalities in (37) and (38) must hold for all values of x 1 , the coefficients of x 1 and the constant terms have to be zero. Define y(t) = k 1 (t)−k 2 (t) and z(t) = e 1 (t)−e 2 (t). Subtracting (38) from (37) yieldṡ
(39) Using the integrating factor method under the boundary conditions λ i (T ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, which implies k i (T ) = e i (T ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, we obtain y(t) = 0, z(t) = 2s 2 3(1+ρ)
1−e (1+ρ)(t−T )
which follows that k 1 (t) = k 2 (t) and e 1 (t) = e 2 (t)+z(t).
With the above results, setting k(t) = k 1 (t) = k 2 (t) and rewriting (37) and (38) givė 
Without loss of generality, assume α 1 < α 2 . Note that the two solutions α 1 and α 2 are particular solutions of (41). Then a general solution of (41) is (see [28] )
where C is the constant of integration. Using the boundary condition k(T ) = 0, the constant C is .
Next, consider the first order partial differential equation (42).
Let μ(t) =
13s+5s+6k(t) 9s1
+ρ and ν(t) = 2s2+3k(t) z(t)−2s−s−ηu0 9s1
. Using the integrating factor method under the boundary conditions e i (T ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, we have e 1 (t) = −e (t−T ) , x * 2 (t) = 1−x * 1 (t) (64) which completes the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Without loss of generality, suppose that operator i knows his bid b i . Further, we assume that operator i infers that the bidding strategy of operator j on A is drawn uniformly and independently from [c A , R He also consulted various companies in the area of wireless systems both in Korea and abroad. His research interest includes radio resource management and information theory in wireless networks, economics of wireless systems, and robotic networks. His degrees include B.S. in Economics (Seoul National University), and M.S. and Ph.D. in operations research (with application to wireless networks, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology).
